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differ from those previously presented, 
for example in annual reports. 
 Market and press reactions to 
such revisions are, predictably, 
negative, and most who have issued 
financial restatements have faced 
serious problems – substantial financial 
losses and falls in share price, 
replacement of their full Board of 
Directors, and, in the worst cases, even 
bankruptcy.
 Yet not all restatements need have 
such devastating effects, argue 
researchers from RSM. Findings from 
their major study of financial restatement 
cases, involving leading US and 
European companies, suggest that 
companies can manage such crises 
judiciously so as to minimise or limit 
the damage to reputation and future 
financial performance.
 The research team – Fred Gertsen 
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and 
Professors Cees van Riel and Guido 
Berens of RSM’s Centre for Corporate 
Communication – saw opportunities for 
generating better understanding not 
only of what triggers the need for 
financial restatements and determines 
their severity but, more critically, how 
to handle them most effectively, should 
the need arise.
 The goal of our research was to 
define such guidelines, by providing 
insight into the managerial behaviours 
that can influence the damage done  
If your company is forced to issue a financial restatement, how 
can the right managerial behaviour help to minimise the damage 
to corporate reputation? 
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Do we trust our public companies to 
always behave honourably and above 
board, when it comes to presenting 
their figures? The answer is debatable. 
First Enron, then Worldcom, and 
thereafter a succession of other high-
profile accounting scandals have 
generated negative headlines in the 
international press and taken their 
toll on investor confidence and 
public trust.
 In most countries, corporate 
governance and accounting 
requirements have become more 
stringent post-Enron. Demands for 
greater transparency mean that 
companies are legally obliged to issue 
financial restatements if their accounts 
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Riel and colleagues were able to track 
just how the companies both 
communicated with the outside world 
– and responded to the surrounding 
speculation and enquiries – through the 
whole period of each financial 
restatement crisis.
The managerial 
challenges
This detailed analysis revealed some 
key managerial issues arising from 
financial restatement. None are 
necessarily disastrous in themselves 
but they are difficult to manage as they 
often occur in combination, intensifying 
the pressure.
 The very fact of being investigated, 
whether by the Justice Department or 
other regulatory bodies, casts suspicion 
on, and potentially discredits, senior 
management who are often already 
implicated. As companies take remedial 
action, heads start to roll. When new 
management arrives, actions and 
decisions from the past are subject to 
minute scrutiny and hindsight also 
comes into play – further discrediting 
the judgement of past managers.
 In what the team called the ‘tip-of-
the-iceberg effect’, a complete loss of 
confidence can be triggered by a detail 
of negligible financial import. The 
spotlight then turns on the company’s 
other accounting and disclosure 
practices, perhaps revealing further 
by  a restatement,” says Van Riel. 
Part of the initial problem, he explains, 
was that onlookers making judgements 
often did not discriminate sufficiently 
between different levels of financial 
restatement and their implications. “The 
first thing we did was to look at what 
categories of financial restatements 
actually exist, and what distinctions 
could be made between them.
 “We came up with four types, based 
on two important criteria. Firstly the 
degrees to which people perceive 
distortion, ie, what is the potential 
impact of the financial restatement on 
the organisation’s future performance. 
Secondly, the perceived degree of 
malicious intent. Are the management 
knowingly and purposely supplying 
distorted financial figures for their 
own gain?”
 Many financial restatements fall into 
the category the team dubbed ‘white 
lies’: little distortion and little or no 
malicious intent, perhaps stemming 
from human accounting errors. “At 
worst, we had what we called ‘black 
magic fraud’: grave cases, like Enron, 
with enormous financial implications 
and a clear and corrupt intent. In 
between we had two other categories: 
‘grey accounting hocus-pocus’ (low on 
malicious intent but high on distortion) 
and ‘purple delusion’ (low on distortion 
but high on malicious intent).”
 To cover all four categories, they 
examined financial restatements in 14 
companies, both US and European. 
The restatements occurred in different 
industries, countries and periods, but 
all had featured prominently in the 
international financial press. Well-
known North American names included 
Goodyear, Nortel, Cablevision and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporate (the US’s largest mortgage 
provider, known as Freddie Mac, which 
hit the headlines again in the summer 
of 2008). The four European firms 
included were Shell, Ahold, Adecco and 
the Italian food company Parmalat. 
 By studying a wealth of company 
annual reports, corporate websites, 
official press releases as well as 
external press coverage and transcripts 
of all the analyst question sessions, Van 
Avoiding reputation damage 
in financial restatements (continued)
by Fred H. M. Gertsen, Cees B. M. van Riel and Guido Berens
“Company executives rounding on one another 
or shifting the blame leaves analysts questioning 
whether corporate governance is still in control.”
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irregularities and errors – and hitting 
market value once again. “What the 
organisation tends to do first is to ask 
for new external accountants,” says 
Van Riel. “They look not only at the 
specific elements where the financial 
restatement is focused, but do the 
whole thing again. And they come in 
with a totally different mindset from the 
original ‘house’ external accountants. 
They really dig deep and want to 
find dirt.”
 The need for financial restatement 
can also lead to paralysis in corporate 
communications. Perhaps through fear 
or lack of experience, some companies 
instinctively adopt a defensive 
communication strategy, or worse still, 
fail to communicate altogether. 
 Comprehension gaps are also 
evident, particularly a failure to 
appreciate internally how the market 
and analysts will interpret and respond 
to company statements. Clear 
distinctions were necessary between 
restatements required because of 
accounting ‘irregularities’ – implying 
intent – and those resulting from simpler 
human accounting ‘errors’, yet 
observers without professional 
accounting training (as is generally true 
within the market) cannot distinguish 
sufficiently between the two. From the 
company’s standpoint, differentiating 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ restatement 
situations in a nuanced way that will 
allow outsiders to assess accurately 
the severity of the situation requires 
considerable force of argument and the 
right accounting rhetoric – and 
management’s capacity to do this well 
and at the appropriate time is critical.
 Communication can also be 
hampered by mixed messages going 
out when the management, auditors 
and other gatekeepers are not ‘aligned’ 
– that is, where they have not reached 
a common view on how to handle the 
situation and especially how/what to 
communicate to the outside world.  
The research team identified four 
distinctions between categories 
of financial restatement and 
labelled them:
• ‘White Lies’
• ‘Black Magic Fraud’
• ‘Grey Accounting Hocus-pocus’
• ‘Purple Delusion’
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more details leads them to assume the 
problems are less widespread, and so 
again decreases the perceived level 
of distortion.
 Being upfront about how the 
restatement may affect business 
operations or financing is seen as a 
‘constructive factor’ in the dialogue 
between companies and analysts. Most 
of the companies studied, however, 
gave general statements, intended to 
reassure, rather than precise details.
 “The cases we analysed provide 
evidence that precise command of 
accounting language as a quality of 
financial leadership has been dismissed 
in favour of ‘governance credos’ and 
sound business performance litany.”
 Another key mismatch is that while 
markets expect chief executives to 
explain technical details and 
demonstrate their grasp of technical 
accounting issues, CEOs fight shy of 
this, leaving such discussions to their 
chief financial officers. “It was one of 
the most striking findings,” says Van 
Riel, and “also one of the most difficult 
to address. It’s very hard to say to 
people at the top of the organisation, 
your knowledge of finance is just too 
limited. How do you handle that? 
How do you tell a CEO that he 
doesn’t understand enough of the 
financial elements?”
 Yet, the researchers argue, with 
systems now requiring greater scrutiny 
Top tips for managing 
financial restatements
So how can companies limit the 
damage? Addressing five key things 
can help, says Van Riel. These were 
areas where differences can really 
show – where they are handled well 
(as in the case of Freddie Mac), the 
benefits are very clearly apparent.
• Confirm the nature of 
the problem
Giving statements that confirm the 
nature of the problem and volunteering 
explanations to analysts or the media 
noticeably improves the understanding 
of these stakeholders. That is critical 
in limiting distortion, because where 
there is insufficient understanding 
negative speculation can circulate. 
“This fits with what we know from 
research about consumer inference-
making,” says Van Riel, “namely that 
people tend to lower their evaluation 
of a product when they have insufficient 
information about it.” 
 But, he adds, the research also 
showed that in these situations 
executives tend to answer questions 
in a relatively straightforward way. 
“Few saw questions as an opportunity 
to explain issues raised in greater 
detail or used a question as an 
opening to persuade the markets 
that correct strategic decisions have 
been taken.”
• Take the blame
Company executives rounding on one 
another or shifting the blame from the 
company to third parties leaves analysts 
questioning whether corporate 
governance is still in control. This can 
make the situation seem worse, and 
can also be damaging to executives’ 
perceived trustworthiness. Rarely did 
companies assume the blame directly 
for the underlying problems – 
understandable, as this might leave 
them more open to litigation. 
 But, as other research has 
suggested, blame-taking is essential in 
restoring trust: “When managers avoid 
blame for something that is clearly their 
responsibility, this is likely to erode 
public trust even further. If accepting 
the blame helps to restore trust where 
‘honest’ mistakes are concerned, does 
this necessarily hold good where lapses 
of ethics are concerned, where 
malicious intent is clearly involved?” 
This is a difficult area, concedes Van 
Riel, as the research evidence from 
elsewhere suggests not. 
• Communicate openly
Open communication is important, right 
from the outset. The scope of disclosure, 
ie, how much the company does or 
does not say, is critical because 
investors and others in the market will 
regard it as a proxy for the seriousness 
of the accounting issues. Providing 
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of procedures and wider public access 
to information, the need for a detailed 
awareness of financial procedures has 
intensified. Both CFO and CEO must 
bear responsibility for financial sign-off 
to regulators. Insufficient technical 
knowledge of accounting will no longer 
be acceptable in mitigation of any 
reporting irregularities.
• Take corporate 
governance measures
Demonstrating not only your 
commitment to corporate governance 
but also your ability to take appropriate 
measures is vital. Where companies 
do this, stock and bond prices improve 
accordingly, because those measures 
lessen fears that the company will act 
with malicious intent in future.
 Wherever fraud or intent was 
suspected, boards and CEOs took 
great pains to assure analysts and the 
media that appropriate action had been 
taken. “In some cases we saw how 
remedial actions  – often those which 
were regulatory – had been taken under 
time pressure. Members of senior 
management were sacrificed for the 
cause, but without any public justification 
of what that cause actually was,” says 
Van Riel.
 As a result, some companies scored 
relatively highly on governance actions 
but far less well on communicating 
openly about the problem.
• Act in compliance 
with the rules
The cases showed that adhering closely 
to policies and regulations after the 
need for a restatement helps to rebuild 
trust, presumably because the market 
again becomes more confident that 
there will not be further instances of 
malicious intent.
 Van Riel is adamant that while 
financial restatements will still be tough 
to weather, taking the right attitude from 
the start can make an enormous 
difference. “Stubborn behaviour is 
really not helpful,” he says. “What we 
have seen is that the way to solve a 
problem like this is first and foremost 
to be open from the beginning. Taking 
the blame because you were 
responsible, and that’s your role. You 
have to show that you really are being 
responsible; that you care about the 
corporate governance measures, and 
that you are truly acting in compliance 
with these regulations. Those who did 
this – as Freddie Mac did – really 
benefited.”  
“Demonstrating not only your commitment to 
corporate governance but also your ability to 
take appropriate measures is vital.” 
